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Frigenti: Flying Solo Without a License

FLYING SOLO WITHOUT A LICENSE: THE RIGHT OF
PRO SE DEFENDANTS TO CRASH AND BURN
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Smith1
(decided July 8, 2010)
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 26, 1995, court observers watched in suspense as
Colin Ferguson, the mass murderer who gunned down six commuters
and attempted to murder nineteen others aboard the Long Island Railroad, proceeded pro se in a Mineola, New York courthouse.2 During
his opening statement Ferguson stated, “There were 93 counts to that
indictment, 93 counts only because it matches the year 1993. If it
had been 1925, it would have been a 25-count indictment.”3 He continued to conduct his outlandish defense by questioning the victims
he shot on the witness stand.4 Verdict: Ferguson was sentenced to
315 years and eight months to life in prison.5
Ferguson was not the first or the last high-profile defendant to
elect to represent himself at trial. John Allen Muhammad, the Washington sniper who went on a shooting rampage killing ten people, al-

1

907 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Term 2d Dep‟t 2010).
Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., A Measure of Our Justice System: A Look at Maine’s Indigent
Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L. REV. 335, 336 (1996).
3
Id. (quoting David Van Biema, A Fool for a Client, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 6, 1995, at
66).
4
John T. McQuiston, Ferguson’s Insanity Defense Angers Victims and His Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/08/nyregion/ferguson-s-insanitydefense-angers-victims-and-his-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
5
David Knowles, Alleged ‘Underwear Bomber’ and the Art of the Pro Se Defense, AOL
NEWS (Sep. 13, 2010, 8:18 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/13/underwear-bombsuspect-abdulmutallab-and-the-art-of-the-pro-se/.
2
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so represented himself at trial.6 His defense consisted of a “rambling
opening statement,” and the badgering of witnesses.7 Verdict: Muhammad was convicted and sentenced to death.8 Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
the medical pathologist who assisted in the suicide of terminally ill
patients, similarly made the decision to go pro se, which he later admitted, “was an act of arrogance he regretted.”9 Verdict: Dr. Kevorkian was sentenced to twenty-five years in a maximum-security prison.10 Ted Bundy, the serial killer who confessed to the murder of
thirty people, also took his hand at defending pro se.11 Verdict: Bundy was sentenced to death in the electric chair.12 More recently, Zacarias Moussaoui, a conspirator in the 9/11 bombings of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, defended himself at trial.13 Verdict:
Moussaoui was sentenced to life in prison without parole.14 While
the crimes committed by these defendants vary in their brutality, they
do share one commonality—each defendant has embarked on a reckless path of self-destruction, confirming that “one who is his own
lawyer has a fool for a client.”15
This case note explores the ramifications of selfrepresentation, supporting a substantial need for greater restriction on
the right and standardization of procedure to provide guidance for
courts and eradicate inconsistent treatment of pro se defendants. After examining how recent decisions have upheld the right to defend
pro se, this case note discusses the constitutional basis and origins of
the right of self-representation. It analyzes the various unresolved is6

Id.
John Allen Muhammad’s Opening Statement, CNN.COM (Oct. 20, 2003, 10:21 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/10/20/muhammad.statement/.
8
Knowles, supra note 5.
9
Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2011, at A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1.
10
Kevorkian Gets 10 to 25 Years in Prison, CNN.COM (Apr. 13, 1999),
http://articles.cnn.com/1999-04-13/us/9904_13_kevorkian.03_1_suicide-charge-tom-youkjack-kevorkian?_s=PM:US.
11
Knowles, supra note 5.
12
Id.
13
Dahlia Lithwick, Moussaoui Hijacks the Legal System, SLATE.COM (May 1, 2002, 6:41
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2002/05/moussaoui_
hijacks_the_legal_system.html.
14
Moussaoui
Formally
Sentenced,
Still
Defiant,
MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12615601/ns/us_news-security/t/moussaoui-formallysentenced-still-defiant/#.T0QOMJgydG4 (last updated May 4, 2006, 12:45 PM).
15
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7
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sues that have arisen from the right of self-representation, leading to
procedural obstacles for courts and adverse consequences for the accused.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In People v. Smith, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, held that defendant‟s constitutional right to self-representation
was violated when the trial court excluded him from two sidebar conferences after he expressly reserved the right to attend by choosing to
proceed pro se.16 The court reasoned that this exclusion violated defendant‟s state constitutional right to self-representation under article
I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution.17
Defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a
child under New York Penal Law § 260.10,18 and he appealed his
conviction.19 Before trial, defendant‟s application to proceed pro se
was granted, permitting him to represent himself at trial with the assistance of standby counsel to raise objections during the people‟s
cross-examination.20 Nonetheless, at trial, defendant was “categorically precluded” from two sidebar conferences over his objection, on
the ground that his attendance at the conferences would be “too disruptive,” and would fail to impress upon the jury that he was in custody.21 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
held that the trial court‟s exclusion of defendant from sidebar conferences violated his right to self-representation, derived from both article 1, § 6 of the New York State Constitution and the Sixth

16

Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39 (“The minutes of the trial indicate that defendant expressly reserved the right to attend sidebar conferences and that the court unequivocally assured defendant that he would attend sidebar conferences.”).
17
Id. at 539; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6 (“In any trial in any court whatever the party accused
shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses
against him or her.”).
18
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2011) (“A person is
guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when: 1. He or she knowingly acts in a manner
likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen
years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his or her life or health . . . .”).
19
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 539.
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Amendment of the United States Constitution.22
In recognizing this fundamental right, the court referred to
People v. Rosen.23 There, the New York Court of Appeals granted
defendant a new trial because the trial court violated defendant‟s constitutional right of self-representation by similarly excluding him
from sidebar conferences.24 Relying on the court‟s analysis in Rosen,
the court in Smith acknowledged that “ „[a] defendant who has
elected to appear pro se is both an accused and an attorney.‟ ”25
Moreover, the court in Smith construed the precedent set in Rosen as
supporting a right to self-representation under both article I, § 6 of
the New York State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.26 Based on this authority, the court in
Smith established that a defendant who elects to proceed pro se “must
be afforded the right to control the organization and content of his defense, make motions, argue points of law, participate in voir dire,
question witnesses and address the court and jury during the trial.”27
The court in Smith also relied on People v. McIntyre,28 in
which the New York Court of Appeals stated that a criminal defendant‟s “right to self-representation embodies one of the most cherished ideals of our culture; the right of an individual to determine his
own destiny.”29 The court in Smith reasoned that the trial court‟s exclusion of defendant from sidebar conferences and standby counsel‟s
attendance at said conferences blatantly conflicted with this cherished
ideal.30
The court in Smith rejected the state‟s assertion that the denial
22

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6).
613 N.E.2d 946 (N.Y. 1993).
24
Id. at 950.
25
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (quoting Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 948).
26
Id. at 539; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10 (6) (McKinney 2011) (stating, “If a
defendant charged with a traffic infraction or infractions only desires to proceed without the
aid of counsel, the court must permit him to do so. In all other cases, the court must permit
the defendant to proceed without the aid of counsel if it is satisfied that he made such decision with knowledge of the significance thereof, but if it is not so satisfied it may not proceed until defendant is provided with counsel, either of his own choosing or by assignment.”); see also People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326 (N.Y. 1974) (stating that “the
New York State Constitution and criminal procedure statute clearly recognize” the right to
self-representation).
27
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539 (citing Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949).
28
324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974).
29
Id. at 325.
30
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
23
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of defendant‟s presence at sidebar conferences promoted a safe and
orderly courtroom.31 Noting alternative measures that the trial court
could have taken, the court referred to People v. Briggs,32 in which
the Appellate Division suggested assigning court officers to accompany defendants at side bar conferences as an acceptable method of
balancing defendant‟s right to self-representation with its duty to
maintain an orderly and secure courtroom.33 In addition, the court
found no indication that defendant engaged in disorderly conduct to
warrant forfeiture of his right to self-representation.34
III.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
A.

United States Constitution

In Faretta v. California,35 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel “when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.”36 The Court held that a defendant has a
constitutional right to voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to
the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se at trial.37 The Court reasoned that embedded within the Sixth Amendment is the explicit
right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel and the implicit right of self-representation that emerges when a defendant
chooses to waive the right to counsel.38
Defendant, Anthony Faretta, was charged with grand theft and
before trial requested to defend himself, rejecting his appointed pub31

Id. Further, the court rejected the trial court‟s argument that it would not permit defendant to approach the bench escorted by court officers because the jury would not be given
the impression that defendant was in custody. Id.
32
728 N.Y.S.2d 763 (App. Div. 2001).
33
Id. at 765; see People v. Vargas, 668 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Riley, 738
N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App. Div. 2002); People v. Walsh, 698 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (App. Div.
1999).
34
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539 (acknowledging that a self-represented defendant “may forfeit the right to self-representation by engaging in disruptive or obstreperous conduct which
is calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the progress of the trial” (citing
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327-28)).
35
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
36
Id. at 807.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 819-20.
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lic defender.39 In a preliminary ruling, the judge accepted defendant‟s waiver of counsel.40 However, after a sua sponte hearing in
which the court scrutinized defendant‟s ability to defend himself, the
judge reversed his prior decision and re-appointed a public defender.41 At trial, only appointed counsel conducted the defense.42 Defendant‟s request to act as co-counsel and efforts to make motions on
his own behalf were rejected.43 Defendant was found guilty and on
appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed that defendant possessed neither a federal nor state constitutional right to selfrepresentation.44
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding that defendant had a constitutional right to selfrepresentation.45 The Court concluded, “The Sixth Amendment does
not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it
grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”46
Moreover, the Court stated, “The right to defend is given directly to
the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails.”47
39

Id. at 807-08.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807-13.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 810-11.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 811-12.
45
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814.
46
Id. at 819.
47
Id. at 819-20. Furthermore, the Court in Faretta recognized that the United States
Courts of Appeals “have repeatedly held that the right of self-representation is protected by
the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 816. Emphasizing that the Sixth Amendment grants the accused
the right to the assistance of counsel, multiple courts have interpreted this amendment to implicitly confer self-representation. Id. at 816-17. In United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271
(2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit indicated that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance
of counsel was not intended to impair a defendant‟s absolute right to conduct his own defense, but was instead designed to supplement the other rights of a defendant. Id. at 274.
The court in Plattner found support for its conclusion in the Judiciary Act of 1789, in statutes and rules governing criminal procedure, and in many state constitutions, which explicitly guarantee self-representation. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (“A defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have
counsel appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial
appearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right.”). Thus, the implicit assertion in the Sixth Amendment‟s guarantee of a right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment‟s
guarantee of due process of law together confer a right on the accused to self-representation
40
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The Court articulated a history of recognition of the right of
self-representation and found a “universal conviction . . . that forcing
a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to
defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”48 In Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann,49 the Supreme Court first acknowledged an
affirmative right of self-representation, noting that with the approval
of the court the accused may freely and intelligently waive his Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.50 In addition, the Court in
Faretta relied on Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,51 in
which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment provides a defendant with the right to take part in all
events where fundamental fairness might be threatened without his
presence.52 The Court in Synder indicated that a pro se defendant
should even be permitted to provide advice or supersede his counsel
and conduct the trial himself.53
The Court in Faretta also found evidence for the right of selfrepresentation implicit in the language of the Sixth Amendment and
acknowledged that self-representation has been engrained in the federal system since the establishment of the United States.54 The Court
concluded that “[t]he right to self-representation—to make one‟s own
defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of
the [Sixth] Amendment.”55 Thus, the Sixth Amendment provides a
guarantee of assistance of counsel for a defendant who voluntarily
in a criminal case. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816-17.
48
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817.
49
317 U.S. 269 (1942).
50
Id. at 275. After defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud, he requested to conduct
his own defense and waived his right to counsel. Id. at 282. Thereafter, defendant waived
his right to trial by jury and was found guilty. Id. The decision was later reversed by the
Second Circuit, which indicated that defendant could not waive his right to counsel before
obtaining counsel. Id. at 270-71. However, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant, the right to counsel was
validly waived by defendant. Adams, 317 U.S. at 279.
51
291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
52
Id. at 105-06.
53
Id. at 106; see also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948), abrogated by
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 482 (1991) (reaffirming defendant‟s privilege to conduct
his own defense at trial).
54
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816-17; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.”).
55
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
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accepts this assistance, and grants the accused the right to conduct the
defense that ultimately determines his destiny.56 However, imposing
counsel upon the accused “violates the logic of the Amendment”
transforming the intended role of an “assistant” into a “master,” a
conversion that starkly juxtaposes the fundamental values of the
American justice system.57
Additionally, the Court found that the right of selfrepresentation is further supported by English legal history.58 Selfrepresentation was a common practice in both England and colonial
America, where numerous colonial charters, statutes, and state constitutions protected the right.59 There is no evidence that the colonists
or framers of the Constitution ever envisioned a system without selfrepresentation or considered the right to defend pro se inferior to the
right to counsel.60 Thus, the Court concluded that the framers intentionally worded the Sixth Amendment to imply the right to selfrepresentation.61
Ultimately, the Court overturned defendant‟s conviction and
permitted defendant to present his own defense.62 Although the right
was upheld, the Court clarified that the right to self-representation is
not absolute, indicating that trial courts may terminate the right in the
event a defendant engages in misconduct.63 Likewise, the decision
authorized courts to terminate self-representation or appoint standby
counsel for the accused when necessary.64
While the majority of the Court in Faretta strongly affirmed
the constitutionality of self-representation, three dissenting justices
briskly contested, finding no independent constitutional basis for the

56

Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 820.
58
Id. at 821-32.
59
Id. (“In the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of self-representation was, if
anything, more fervent than in England.”).
60
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 836.
63
Id. at 834 n.46.
64
Id. Furthermore, in Martinez v. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has no federal
constitutional right to self-representation on appeal. Id. at 163-64 (“[N]either the holding
nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to selfrepresentation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.”).
57
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right to self-representation in a criminal trial.65 As emphasized in
Chief Justice Berger‟s dissenting opinion, the unequivocal provision
for self-representation in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent unequivocal omission of self-representation from the Sixth
Amendment suggest the possibility that the founders of the Amendment intended no mandate of self-representation and desired to leave
the issue to be resolved through legislative process.66 The dissent also questioned the Court‟s historical findings, insisting that the framers purposefully excluded self-representation from the language of
the Sixth Amendment.67 Additionally, the dissenters expressed policy concerns that the right to proceed pro se would result in a proceThe dissenters further warned that selfdural massacre.68
representation would compromise the integrity and public confidence
in the justice system and declared that “[t]he system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction.”69
The majority‟s interpretation in Faretta seems flawed when
viewed in light of the intended role of the attorney, who in no way
asserts his power over the client, but instead has an ethical obligation
to provide his help and assistance to ensure his client makes informed
decisions. Those decisions ultimately rest in the hands of the client.
Accordingly, it seems nonsensical to conclude that a defendant, who
65

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836-38 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority‟s assertion
that the right to self-representation “is tucked between the lines of the Sixth Amendment,”
and declaring that “the right to counsel is an integral part of the bundle making up the larger
„right to a defense as we know it‟ ”).
66
Id. at 844-45 (Berger, C.J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is at least equally plausible to conclude that
the Amendment‟s silence as to the right of self-representation indicates that the Framers
simply did not have the subject in mind when they drafted the language.”).
68
Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (posing an extensive list of procedural questions
left unanswered by the Court‟s opinion, which he warned would “haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation”); id. at 838-39 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating: “ „Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he not be guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.‟ ”
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))).
69
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840.
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is required to have competent representation, assumes any subordinate role equivalent to that of a servant. To the contrary, a defendant
maintains the ability to control his case and to find new representation if he so desires. Thus, this analogy is unfounded when viewed in
light of the traditional role of a servant, who unlike a defendant, lacks
authority to terminate his master and retain a new master to better suit
his needs.
B.

New York Constitution

Unlike the implied right to self-representation in the United
States Constitution, the New York Constitution and New York Criminal Procedure Law expressly set forth the right to selfrepresentation.70 In McIntyre, the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to defend pro se is explicitly supported by the
New York Constitution and New York Criminal Procedure Law.71
The court concluded that even where the accused insists on conducting his own defense to his detriment, “respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if
he so desires and if he makes the choice „with eyes open.‟ ”72 After
acknowledging multiple motivations for which a defendant might
want to conduct his own defense, the court stressed that the right to
defend pro se is not absolute, but subject to restrictions to promote
70

McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326. The court in McIntyre traced the origins of selfrepresentation, declaring that the right is implicit in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses, codified in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and contained in the United States Code. Id.; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006).
71
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326; see also N.Y CONST. art I, § 6 (“In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel as in civil actions . . . .”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(6) (McKinney 2011) (If a
defendant . . . only desires to proceed without the aid of counsel, the court must permit him
to do so.”). In McIntyre, after defendant was convicted of murder and robbery in the first
degree, he elected to defend himself pro se; however, his request was denied based on defendant‟s outburst and his assertion that assigned counsel was very competent. McIntyre,
324 N.E.2d at 324-25. Although the “Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial
court was justified in denying the Pro se motion in light of the defendant‟s inability to maintain self-control,” the Supreme Court reversed, indicating that disruptive behavior which is a
direct reaction to denial of defendant‟s motion to defend pro se, or which results from trial
court‟s conducting inquiry in an abusive manner “calculated to belittle a legitimate application,” “will not justify the forfeiture of the right of self-representation.” Id. at 325, 328.
72
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 325 (quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965)).
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the orderly administration of justice and prevent ensuing attacks on
verdicts due to lack of fundamental fairness.73
In McIntyre, the court specified three requirements for a defendant to defend pro se. First, the request to defend pro se must be
“unequivocal and timely asserted” in order to prevent obstruction in
the courtroom.74 Second, the defendant must make a “knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.”75 Finally, the defendant
must “not engage[] in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.”76
Hence, the right to selfrepresentation is forfeited “[w]hen a defendant‟s conduct is calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the progress of the
trial.”77
Further, in People v. Rosen,78 the New York Court of Appeals
stated, “Unlike the Federal right to self-representation, which is only
implicit in the Sixth Amendment, the State constitutional right to
self-representation is explicit and unambiguous.”79 In Rosen, defendant requested to proceed pro se after he was indicted on charges of
conspiracy, grand larceny, and other felonies.80 The court allowed
defendant to proceed pro se with standby counsel as his legal advisor,
but imposed a restriction barring defendant from attending sidebar
conferences.81 Defendant was convicted, but his conviction was later
reversed by the New York Court of Appeals, which held that the trial
court‟s arbitrary exclusion of defendant from sidebar conferences violated his constitutional right to self-representation.82 The court rea73
Id. at 326-27 (articulating multiple reasons why defendants wish to represent themselves, which include viewing counsel as an extension of the “oppressive judicial system,”
desiring to save legal costs when defendant is of moderate resources and ineligible for assigned counsel, refusing counsel in order to lay the foundation for mistrial or a later attack of
the conviction, and dissatisfaction with counsel‟s defense strategies).
74
Id. at 327.
75
Id. The court noted that “mere ignorance of the law cannot vitiate an effective waiver
of counsel as long as the defendant was cognizant of the dangers of waiving counsel at the
time it was made.” Id. Moreover, in determining competency of a defendant, the court may
assess factors such as age, education, occupation, and prior exposure to legal procedures.
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 328.
78
613 N.E.2d 946.
79
Id. at 948.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 947.
82
Id.
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soned that the quintessential values upheld by the right to defend pro
se—“to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused”—“are
threated when a defendant who has assumed the risks inherent in selfrepresentation is arbitrarily denied, despite specific request, the opportunity to attend sidebar discussions.”83 However, the court in Rosen advised that “the right to attend sidebars is no broader than the
right to self-representation itself, which may within an appropriate
exercise of discretion be denied or divested.”84
IV.

DEFINING THE UNIVERSE OF SELF-REPRESENTATION

In the aftermath of Faretta, both federal and state courts have
attempted to combat the stark implications of self-representation by
instituting limitations on waiving the right to counsel and defending
pro se. Left behind in the largely undefined universe created by Faretta, courts have independently defined boundaries in various areas
relating to self representation, including: waiving the right to counsel,
the role of standby counsel, hybrid representation, forfeiting the right
to self-representation, and mental competency. These standards are
intended to protect the interests of pro se defendants and preserve the
integrity of the justice system.
A.

Waiving the Right to Counsel

No federal requirement obligates trial courts to inform a criminal defendant of the right to self-representation when defendant has
not asserted this right.85 Hence, only when a defendant elects to
83

Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949-50 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77
(1984)).
84
Id. at 950 (citing McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327).
85
See United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the district
court need not inform a defendant of his right to proceed pro se prior to the assertion of such
a right); Maldonado, 348 F.2d at 16 (acknowledging the burdens of a notice requirement
which if required would make “the task of administering the overriding constitutional policy
in favor of granting a lawyer to every person accused of a serious crime . . . unduly treacherous”); see also United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 928
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that no requirement exists for trial courts to advise criminal defendants of the right to defend pro se); People v. Slaughter, 404 N.E.2d 1058, 1062
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that failure to expressly inform defendant of the right to proceed
pro se did not constitute error under Faretta); State v. Garcia, 600 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Wash.
1979) (concluding that no duty exists for a trial court to inform a defendant of his right to
self-representation).
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waive counsel and proceed pro se must a trial court inform defendant
of his right to self-representation.86 However, the United States Supreme Court maintains that there is a strong presumption against
waiver of the right to counsel, observing that whether an intelligent
waiver of right to counsel is made should be judged on a case by case
basis after careful consideration of the particular facts and circumstances.87 In Carnley v. Cochran,88 the United States Supreme Court
articulated the guidelines for a valid waiver. The Court stated, “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show,
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” 89
Aside from the strong presumption against waiver of the right
to counsel, the Court in Faretta stated that “[defendant] should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that „he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.‟ ”90 However, the Court‟s assertion ignited a circuit split concerning whether trial courts are required
to, or merely should, admonish defendants of the dangers and disad86

See Munkus v. Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to be informed of the right to defend pro se); see
also Stano v. Dugger 921 F.2d 1125, 1144 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Once the right of selfrepresentation has been asserted clearly and unequivocally . . . then and only then is that
court . . . required to conduct the requisite inquiry to determine whether the criminal defendant‟s decision to represent himself is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”).
87
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
88
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
89
Id. at 516. The Court further explained:
It has been pointed out that „courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver‟ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we „do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.‟
....
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of trial court, in which the accused—
whose life or liberty is at stake—is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the
accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether
there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court,
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear
upon the record.
Id. at 514-15 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
90
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279).
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vantages of self-representation.91 Although trial courts should conduct an inquiry into defendant‟s background by focusing on factors
such as age, level of education, mental capacity, prior experience
with legal proceedings, and understanding of proceedings, wide discretion rests with trial courts in deciding what constitutes a valid
warning of the dangers of self-representation.92
Defendant must assert his right to self-representation in a
timely manner or else he waives this right.93 In United States v. Dunlap,94 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that once a trial begins, the decision to allow defendant to proceed pro se is left to
the discretion of the trial court.95 A request to proceed pro se is
termed timely if it is made before meaningful trial proceedings have
91
Compare United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that the
trial judge must conduct a hearing to ensure that the accused understands the dangers of selfrepresentation), Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 730-32 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that it is the
trial court‟s responsibility to ensure that a defendant is made aware of the dangers of selfrepresentation), United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that the
court has a responsibility to ensure the choice of self-representation is made knowingly and
intelligently), and United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Faretta to require trial courts to conduct a special hearing to ensure that the accused understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se), with United States v. Hafen,
726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that a court is not required to provide a short statement of its reasons for finding a defendant‟s waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent), Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721-22 (indicating that while there is a preference for trial courts
to explain the risks of self-representation to the accused, no explanation is required), and
United States v. Tompkins, 623 F.2d 824. 828-29 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that no special
hearing is required for a valid waiver of an accused‟s right to counsel); cf. McDowell v.
United States, 484 U.S. 980, 981 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“Because a conflict among the lower courts has emerged concerning the proper application
and interpretation of our decision in Faretta, I would grant certiorari and address the question presented by this petition.”).
92
John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 483, 516-17 (1996). The Supreme Court, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285
(1988), was presented with an opportunity to answer the question of whether a hearing or
inquiry should be required whenever a defendant requests to proceed pro se; however, it
failed to resolve the issue. Id. at 298-300. While the Court stated that the waiver of counsel
standard articulated in Faretta should be applied, it failed to address the proper application
of that standard. Id.
93
See Parton v. Wyrick, 704 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the trial court‟s refusal to allow defendant to proceed pro se when the request for self-representation was made
on the morning of the trial).
94
577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978).
95
Id. at 868 (stating that the timeliness requirement is justified by “the need to minimize
disruptions, to avoid inconvenience and delay, to maintain continuity, and to avoid confusing
the jury”).
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begun or before the jury has been impaneled, unless the request is a
delay tactic.96 Thus, in order for defendant to validly waive his right
to counsel he must make a clear, voluntarily, and intelligent waiver of
the right to counsel in a timely manner, after being informed of the
dangers inherent in his decision.97
Additionally, to effectually waive his right to counsel, the defendant must communicate his desire to proceed pro se to the court.98
To effectively communicate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the
defendant must make a statement from which the trial judge can reasonably conclude that defendant desires to proceed pro se.99 The defendant should express this statement in unequivocal terms.100 However, when a defendant‟s desire to waive his right to counsel is less
than clear, the validity of the waiver is left to the discretion of the
court.101 In fact, some courts have allowed defendants to implicitly
waive their right to counsel through conduct.102 For example, in
United States v. Auen,103 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that defendant implicitly waived the right to counsel at trial by
continually refusing legal representation after repeated offers.104
96

Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id.
98
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
99
Leonard v. State, 486 A.2d 163, 169 (Md. 1985).
100
See People v. Gillian, 861 N.E.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that a defendant‟s request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal where “defendant raised the argument for self-representation as a way of obtaining the dismissal of his first assigned counsel”). Compare Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1033 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
defendant did not “invoke his right to self-representation clearly and unequivocally”), with
Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1064 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation).
101
See United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The question of
waiver is one of inference from the facts. As a matter both of logic and of common
sense, . . . if a person is offered a [clear] choice between three things and says „no‟ to the first
and the second, he‟s chosen the third even if he stands mute when asked whether the third is
indeed his choice.”).
102
See United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a defendant can “waive the right to counsel through his own contumacious conduct”).
103
864 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1988).
104
Id. at 5; see also United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that defendant implicitly refused appointed counsel by dismissing four consecutive court
appointed attorneys); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1958) (explaining that “where a defendant able to retain counsel has been advised by the court that he must
retain counsel by a certain reasonable time, and where there is no showing why he has not
retained counsel within that time, the court may treat his failure to provide for his own defense as a waiver of his right to counsel and require such defendant to proceed to trial with97
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Moreover, other courts have treated defendant‟s failure to retain
counsel, after being advised by the court to do so within a reasonable
amount of time, as a failure to provide for his own defense, and thereby, a waiver of the right to counsel.105
Similarly, New York courts require that a defendant‟s request
to waive his right to counsel be made unequivocally and timely.106 A
defendant‟s request to represent himself “ „must be clearly and unconditionally presented to the trial court‟ ” in order “to ensure convicted defendants [do] not „pervert the system by subsequently claiming a denial of their pro se right.‟ ”107 An application to defend pro se
is timely when it is asserted before the trial commences because “the
potential for obstruction and diversion is minimal.”108 At that juncture, the court can conduct a thorough inquiry without causing delay
and confusion; however, once the trial begins the right is only granted
under compelling circumstances. 109
Further, New York courts require that a defendant make a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel beout an attorney. Such a waiver is similar in its consequences to an election made by an indigent defendant.”).
105
Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1946); United States v. Hartenfeld, 113 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1940). However, other circuits require misconduct on behalf of defendant to establish a waiver of counsel through conduct. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1995). The court in Goldberg drew a distinction between
the concept of forfeiture and the concept of waiver, indicating that “forfeiture results in the
loss of a right regardless of the defendant‟s knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether
the defendant intended to relinquish the right.” Id. at 1100. Only the Eleventh Circuit has
acknowledged this distinction, as indicated by its decision in United States v. McLeod, 53
F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995), in which it concluded that abuse by a defendant toward his attorney might result in forfeiture of defendant‟s right to counsel. Id. at 325. But see United
States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that a defendant who knowingly retains an attorney with a scheduling conflict and fails to retain other counsel within a reasonable time waives his right to counsel); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th
Cir. 1983) (concluding that “persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and
appointment of new counsel . . . is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of counsel”). Other courts insist that a waiver by conduct may result only after a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney “if he engages in dilatory tactics,” and
continues to engage in misconduct. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100; see, e.g., United States v.
Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that defendant‟s failure to hire counsel
constituted a waiver by conduct); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir.
1990) (concluding that defendant‟s dilatory conduct resulted in a waiver by conduct).
106
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
107
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at
327).
108
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
109
Id.
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fore proceeding pro se.110 Determining whether a waiver is knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent requires courts to undertake a “searching
inquiry” to ensure defendant is fully informed of the dangers and disadvantages of defending pro se.111 Thus, it is well established that a
defendant can only waive his constitutional right to counsel if he is
informed of the risks associated with doing so.112
In People v. Ward,113 defendant appealed his conviction for
robbery and assault on the ground that the court failed to ensure he
fully understood the inherent dangers of defending pro se. 114 The
Appellate Division reiterated the importance of conducting an exhaustive inquiry into defendant‟s decision to waive his right to counsel, which ensures that the choice is made willingly, with full knowledge of the dangers involved.115 This inquiry requires appropriate
record evidence demonstrating that the trial court has delved into defendant‟s age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures, and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.116 However, the court need not evaluate
all of these factors to find a valid waiver of counsel. In evaluating
the validity of a waiver, New York courts have “eschewed application of any rigid formula and endorsed the use of a nonformalistic,
flexible inquiry.”117
In People v. Smith,118 the New York Court of Appeals indicated that the trial court‟s record exploration of the issue “must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular
importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication.”119 Based on these flexible criteria, courts have noted that a
waiver of the right to counsel will not be deemed ineffective simply
because the trial judge does not ask questions designed to elicit each
110

Id.
People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1991).
112
Id.
113
613 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1994).
114
Id. at 491.
115
Id.
116
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
117
People v. Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 2002) (endorsing a non-formalistic
flexible inquiry).
118
705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998).
119
Id. at 1208.
111
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of the specific items of information.120 Still, there is no existing standardized procedure for admonishing defendants of the dangers of
self-representation, leaving lower courts with “broad discretion in
how they warn defendants.”121 Thus, the degree of protection afforded to defendants “largely depends upon the courtroom in which
they are prosecuted.”122
B.

Defining the Role of Standby Counsel

In Faretta, the Court asserted that a trial court may—even
over the objection of defendant—appoint standby counsel in selfrepresentation cases to assist defendant if and when he seeks help,
and to take over if self-representation must be terminated during trial.123 In McKaskle v. Wiggins,124 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the role of standby counsel and upheld defendant‟s conviction, despite standby counsel providing unsolicited and undesirable
assistance.125 In Wiggins, the court appointed two attorneys to serve
as standby counsel to pro se defendant.126 Throughout the trial, defendant altered his desire for assistance of standby counsel, fluctuating from requesting support to resisting assistance.127 After defendant was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, he appealed his
conviction on the ground that standby counsel had improperly interfered with his right to conduct his own defense, thereby depriving
him of his right to self-representation.128
Establishing a two-part test for determining when standby
counsel violates a criminal defendant‟s right to self-representation,

120
People v. Providence, 813 N.E.2d 632, 635 (2004); see also Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at
1156 (stating that when determining if a defendant effectively waived the right to counsel,
all that is required is a reliable basis for appellate review).
121
Decker, supra note 92, at 516-17.
122
Id.
123
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
124
465 U.S. 168 (1984).
125
Id. at 173.
126
Id. at 170-71.
127
Id. at 171-73.
128
Id. at 170. The Fifth Circuit held that Wiggins‟ Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation was violated by the unwanted involvement of standby counsel. Wiggins v.
Estelle, 681 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168 (1984). In doing so, it sought to establish a clear rule that “court-appointed standby
counsel is „to be seen, but not heard.‟ ” Id. at 273.
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the Court held that standby counsel did not infringe upon defendant‟s
right to self-representation.129 According to the Court, the pro se defendant must first establish that he retained “actual control over the
case.”130 A defendant does not maintain actual control if standby
counsel substantially interferes with significant tactical decisions of
defendant, assumes control of the questioning of witnesses, or speaks
on matters of importance in defendant‟s place against his objection.131
Next, participation by standby counsel without the consent of defendant should not be allowed to destroy the jury‟s perception that defendant is representing himself.132 Ultimately, the Court found that
defendant maintained actual control over the case and that participation of standby counsel did not destroy the jury‟s perception that defendant was representing himself.133 Thus, despite the fact that
standby counsel intervened without defendant‟s permission over fifty
times during the three-day trial,134 the Court found that defendant was
afforded his right to self-representation.135 Although the Court in
Wiggins attempted to provide guidelines, the question of what constitutes acceptable participation of standby counsel without obstructing
the right to self-representation remains unresolved.
Likewise, New York courts allow for the appointment of
standby counsel for pro se defendants, even over objections.136 However, the appointment of standby counsel is not a constitutional right,
but a matter of trial judge management, which is left to the discretion
of the judge.137 In People v. Mirenda,138 the New York Court of Appeals found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by deny129

McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177-79, 188.
Id. at 178.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 178-79.
133
Id. at 185.
134
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 191 (White, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 185 (majority opinion). But see id. at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (expressing
concerns about allowing standby counsel to impede on the rights of pro se defendants).
136
People v. Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (N.Y. 1982); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 6-3.7 (American Bar Association,
3d
ed.
2000),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications
/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_trialjudge.html#6-3.7 (stating that it is
advisable to appoint standby counsel to protect defendants and to facilitate the trial, not only
in serious cases, but in cases expected to be long or complicated or where there are multiple
defendants).
137
People v. Mirenda, 442 N.E.2d 49, 51 (N.Y. 1982).
138
Id.
130
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ing defendant‟s request for standby counsel, because defendant was
fully aware of the potential pitfalls of self-representation.139 Moreover, because there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of
standby counsel, defendants are not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel, unless standby counsel “held that title in
name only . . . [but in reality,] acted as the defendant‟s lawyer
throughout the proceedings.”140
Moreover, New York courts have set parameters for the
amount of intervention standby counsel may have without violating
defendant‟s right to present his own case. In People v. Hilts,141 the
Appellate Division instructed standby counsel only to assist defendant upon his request, forewarning counsel not to provide unsolicited
advice during trial.142 Relatedly, in People v. Nevitt,143 the Appellate
Division concluded that standby counsel did not unduly interfere with
defendant‟s right to try his case because counsel conferred with defendant, obtained consent before challenging any of the jurors, and
defendant failed to object to any of counsel‟s representation during
the trial.144
One thing that is clear: standby counsel can serve as a worthy
tool for pro se defendants, who lack access to many legal materials
available to lawyers.145 Also, standby counsel can assist by stepping
in if defendant chooses to be absent from the trial. Thus, judges may
appoint standby counsel at their discretion in an effort to promote justice and grant impartial trials.146

139

Id.
United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1997).
141
846 N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div. 2007).
142
Id. at 752 (finding that while a defendant has a right to proceed pro se, he has no right
to hybrid representation, and thus the county court was well within its authority to impose
restrictions on assigned counsel‟s continued assistance).
143
619 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1994).
144
Id. at 7.
145
See United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
“that when a defendant (pretrial detainee) is offered the assistance of appointed counsel and
refuses the same, no constitutional right exists mandating that the prisoner in the alternative
be provided access to a law library should he choose to refuse the services of courtappointed counsel”).
146
Decker, supra note 92, at 537.
140
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Hybrid Representation

Courts uniformly hold that defendant is not entitled to hybrid
representation, wherein defendant serves as co-counsel at his own trial.147 Faretta does not guarantee a constitutional right to hybrid representation, as a defendant has the right to either conduct his own
defense or have an attorney conduct his defense—but not both.148
However, while the right to “hybrid representation is not constitutionally guaranteed, it is constitutionally permissible,” as demonstrated by some courts allowing the accused to assume various lawyering
functions,149 but only as a “matter of grace.”150
Despite lack of agreement among jurisdictions as to whether
hybrid representation is permissible, there are several “well-adheredto rules” regarding the complex issue:151 First, by retaining counsel,
a criminal defendant relinquishes “the right to conduct part of his
own defense.”152 Second, where hybrid representation is permitted,
the court is still required to “obtain a valid waiver of counsel from the
defendant.”153 Third, once a defendant elects “to proceed pro se, the
defendant cannot conduct part of the trial and then ask counsel to
conduct other portions.”154 Finally, after a pro se defendant welcomes “participation by counsel, any subsequent participation by
counsel is presumed to occur with the defendant‟s approval, unless
the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews the request to
proceed without counsel.”155
In People v. Rodriguez,156 the New York Court of Appeals
stated, “While the Sixth Amendment and the State Constitution af-

147

See Wilson v. Hurt, 39 Fed. App‟x 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no constitutional
right to hybrid representation).
148
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.
149
Decker, supra note 92, at 537-39.
150
State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Tenn. 1982).
151
Decker, supra note 92, at 539-40.
152
Id. (citing United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that any
decision to allow or disallow hybrid representation rests in the discretion of the trial court)).
153
Id. (citing United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
“[t]he district court has the authority to allow, if the accused desires, a hybrid form of representation in which the accused assumes some of the lawyer‟s functions”)).
154
Id. (citing People v. Partee, 511 N.E.2d 1165, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)).
155
Id. (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183).
156
741 N.E.2d 882, 884 (N.Y. 2000) (indicating that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to hybrid representation).
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ford a defendant the right to counsel or to self-representation, they do
not guarantee a right to both. These are „separate rights depicted on
the opposite sides of the same [constitutional] coin. To choose one
obviously means to forego the other.‟ ”157 Based on this assertion,
the court emphasized that the decision to allow hybrid representation
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and acknowledged
that many courts have refused to recognize a right of defendants
represented by counsel to simultaneously act in their own defense.158
In fact, some courts prohibit hybrid representation altogether.159
D.

Forfeiting the Right to Self-representation

A defendant‟s right to self-representation may be terminated
when defendant engages in seriously obstructive behavior, based on
the court‟s responsibility to maintain order, safety, and prevent disruption and delay in the courtroom. In Faretta, the Court stated,
“The right to self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity
of the courtroom” nor the right to engage in “serious and obstructionist misconduct.”160 In other words, the right to self-representation is
not “to be used as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of
the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.”161
Although courts have attempted to provide guidelines in determining when disruptive conduct should result in forfeiture of the
right to self-representation, drawing the line “between a manipulative
effort to present arguments and a sincere desire to dispense with the
benefits of counsel” has presented challenges. 162 In United States v.
Vernier,163 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that defendant was not unconstitutionally denied his right to self-representation
157

Id. at 884 (quoting United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir 1990)) (alteration
in original).
158
Id. at 885.
159
See Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987) (“[T]here are only two types of representation constitutionally guaranteed—representation by counsel and representation pro
se—and they are mutually exclusive.”). The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow
hybrid representation, mandating that Maryland courts strictly ensure that defendants proceed with or without effective assistance of counsel. Id.
160
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
161
United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000).
162
Id.
163
381 Fed. App‟x 325, 325 (5th Cir. 2010).
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in his prosecution for carjacking when he “posed a risk of violence
and escape, . . . was defiant and troublesome, . . . boasted that he
wanted to go out in a bloody confrontation, to disrupt his trial, and to
make news,” and attempted a violent escape from jail in the fortyeight hours preceding trial.164 The court reasoned that the limitation
of defendant‟s right to defend pro se was warranted because his behavior was intended to cause delay or some tactical advantage.165
Additionally, Faretta suggested that if a pro se defendant is removed
from the court proceedings due to disruptive behavior, standby counsel is permitted to step in to conduct his defense.166
The New York Court of Appeals also limited the right to selfrepresentation by mandating that a defendant may not engage in conduct which would prevent the “fair and orderly exposition of the issues.”167 The court in McIntyre declared, “When a defendant‟s conduct is calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the
progress of the trial he forfeits his right to self-representation.”168
However, despite articulating this principle, the court concluded that
defendant‟s misconduct was a provoked outburst that did not justify
the forfeiture of defendant‟s right to self-representation.169 In People
v. Cooks,170 the Appellate Division authorized limiting selfrepresentation based on misconduct when it upheld the trial court‟s
revocation of the right to self-representation, when “[d]efendant was
disruptive, feigned mental illness, feigned physical ailments and re-

164

Id. at 329.
Id. at 328; see also United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that defendant‟s behavior demonstrated that he was playing “cat and mouse” with
the court by requesting to represent himself); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir.
2000) (stating that determining whether a pro se defendant intends only disruption and delay
is the kind of determination district courts must make routinely, but holding that the court
did not make a sufficient inquiry).
166
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; see also United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1027
(7th Cir. 1980) (permitting standby counsel to take over for an absent pro se defendant to
prevent undue delay or mistrial).
167
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
168
Id. at 328.
169
Id. (“Just as the court may not rely on a postruling outburst to validate an erroneous
denial, the court may not goad the defendant to disruptive behavior by conducting its inquiry
in an abusive manner calculated to belittle a legitimate application.”). But see id. at 329
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that defendant‟s behavior resulted from the trial
judge‟s provocation and concluding that defendant waived his right to defend pro se by his
disruptive conduct).
170
812 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 2006).
165
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peatedly asked to leave the courtroom and claimed illness when
summoned back.”171 In sum, the governmental interest in ensuring
the integrity and efficiency of the judicial process will at times outweigh a defendant‟s interest in acting as his own lawyer.
E.

Mental Competency

The United States Supreme Court, by delineating the requisite
degree of mental competency for defendants, has further limited the
right to self-representation. In Godinez v. Moran,172 the Supreme
Court ruled that the competency standard used to determine a defendant‟s ability to waive the right to counsel is no higher than that used
to determine a defendant‟s ability to stand trial.173 Hence, if a defendant is competent to stand trial, no further examination by the court is
necessary. The Court reasoned that “the competence that is required
of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence
to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.”174 Essentially, the Court insisted that the decision to waive counsel should
not require any higher level of mental capacity than what is required
to waive other constitutional rights.175 Thus, while waiving the right
to counsel requires that courts conduct an extensive inquiry into defendant‟s decision, defendant need not maintain any heightened level
of competence to enter into such a decision in the first place—all that
is required is a knowing and voluntary waiver.176
The Supreme Court first articulated a standard of mental
competence for criminal defendants on trial in Dusky v. United
States.177 The Court held that in order for a defendant to be considered competent for a criminal proceeding he must have “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and . . . [must have] a rational as well as fac171
Id. at 530; see also People v. Thomas, 900 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775-76 (App. Div. 2010)
(holding that the trial court properly denied defendant his right to self-representation because
a fair and orderly trial “would not have been feasible” in light of defendant‟s position that,
among other things, he was entitled to absolute immunity because he was “Almighty God”
and “King of the United States,” and that he was born on a day the earth spun backwards).
172
509 U.S. 389 (1993).
173
Id. at 399.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 400.
177
362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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tual understanding of the proceedings against him.”178 Thus, all that
is required is that “the accused must be sufficiently competent to follow the proceedings, evaluate the evidence, and understand the significance of what is transpiring in the courtroom.”179 This standard has
been widely criticized by those who cannot see why “[a]n infinitely
more comprehensive and intricate command of the law is required of
a competent attorney, yet the application of the Dusky test allows the
layperson who wishes to proceed pro se to do so despite a lack of
technical legal knowledge, at best, and regardless of mental illness, at
worst.”180 Although the right to competent counsel is undoubtedly an
essential right of any defendant, a defendant forfeits this right in
choosing to proceed pro se. Hence, the guidelines articulated in Godinez and Dusky raise countervailing concerns. On the one hand,
there are those who wish to firmly uphold the autonomy of selfrepresentation without heightening any requirement of competence.
However, others fear lower standards of competency fail to appropriately assess a defendant‟s ability to conduct his own defense.181
In Indiana v. Edwards,182 the Supreme Court addressed the
concerns of Dusky critics by considering whether a state may bar the
accused from defending himself when defendant is “a criminal defendant whom a state court found mentally competent to stand trial if
represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct the trial himself.”183 The Court stated:
[T]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant‟s mental
capacities . . . [and] permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough
to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from
178

Id.
Decker, supra note 92, at 519.
180
Id.; see also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A person who is
„competent‟ to play basketball is not thereby „competent‟ to play the violin.”).
181
See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“To try, convict, and punish
one so helpless to defend himself contravenes fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our criminal justice system.”).
182
554 U.S.164 (2008).
183
Id. at 167. In its analysis, the Court revisited the Faretta holding, and made clear that
Faretta did not answer the issue regarding mental competency, noting that both the decision
itself and later cases have affirmed that the right to self-representation is not absolute. Id. at
171.
179
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severe mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.184
The decision in Edwards demonstrates an effort on behalf of the
Court to protect societal interests and to maintain judicial efficiency
by permitting courts to inquire “whether a defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”185
However, despite Edwards’ allowance for states to differentiate between a defendant‟s competency to stand trial and a defendant‟s
competency to defend pro se, courts continue to adhere to low standards in making this determination.186 In fact, some courts have blatantly rejected any suggestion of a higher standard of competence for
waiver of counsel.187
In People v. Reason,188 the New York Court of Appeals rejected the contention that there are two separate and distinct levels of
mental capacity—one standard to stand trial, and another standard to
waive the right to counsel.189 The court noted that the requirement of
mental competency to stand trial arose at a time before defendant was
entitled to have counsel assigned, and therefore was intended to ensure he had sufficient mental capacity to understand the proceedings
and make his own defense.190 Based on this history, the court maintained that it would be nonsensical to conclude that a standard designed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending
himself is inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own defense.191
Moreover, the court observed the pragmatic difficulties involved in
formulating a workable, heightened standard to assess competency
184

Id. at 177-78.
Id.
186
Decker, supra note 92, at 522-23 (noting the case of Colin Ferguson, who was convicted of six counts of murder for his “shooting rampage on a commuter train in Long Island, New York, [which] illustrates the potentially devastating injustice caused by allowing
an incompetent defendant to proceed pro se”).
187
See People v. Anderson, No. C058629, 2009 WL 3809633, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
16, 2009) (stating that under California law, “a defendant competent to stand trial is also
competent to waive his right to counsel, and therefore a court cannot require a higher standard of competence to accept the waiver.”).
188
334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975).
189
Id. at 574.
190
Id.
191
Id.
185
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without infringing on a defendant‟s constitutional right to selfrepresentation.192 According to the court, however, mental capacity
remains relevant in the waiver of counsel because the determination
that it is intelligent and voluntary “may well turn, even in major part,
on the mental capability of the defendant at the time in the circumstances.”193
In People v. Tafari,194 the Appellate Division held that defendant was improperly denied his constitutional right to selfrepresentation when his request to represent himself at trial was denied due to mental illness and concerns that his medication would affect his ability to understand the proceedings.195 The court reasoned
that because defendant was examined and found competent after responding to the court‟s apprehensions about the risks of proceeding
pro se, he should have been afforded his right to selfrepresentation.196 Moreover, in People v. Reilly,197 the Appellate Division held that the trial court was not required to order a competency
examination of defendant before it granted defendant‟s application to
defend pro se.198 In that case, defendant, who was arrested and
charged with burglary and larceny, was hospitalized for approximately three weeks and diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive
disorder.199 Defendant elected to proceed pro se at trial and his request was granted.200 Defendant‟s right to proceed pro se was later
revoked when he attempted to have a witness identify him as Jesus
Christ; however, he was ultimately found competent to stand trial and
convicted on all counts.201 On appeal, observing that appropriate
warnings and careful consideration were provided, the court found
that the trial court validly honored defendant‟s request to proceed pro
se.202

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
891 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 2009).
Id. at 713.
Id.
631 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1995).
Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Reilly, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04.
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CONCLUSION

While the Sixth Amendment is intended to provide protection
to defendants in the criminal trial process, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Faretta has largely undermined this purpose. Moreover, the
explicit grant of the right to self-representation provided in the New
York State Constitution has only further eroded “jurisprudential integrity.”203 In constitutionalizing the right to self-representation, courts
were left to cope with the onerous task of defining the extent of this
right, which has resulted in a plethora of inconsistent decisions
among jurisdictions.204 While the Court‟s decision in Faretta was
justifiably intended to promote the autonomy and uphold the rights of
criminal defendants, it has resulted in injurious implications for those
accused, who ignorantly forfeit competent legal representation to
their own detriment.
Not only does the decision continue to present harmful consequences for defendants who choose to exercise this right, but it has
also damaged the integrity and efficiency of the courts by wasting
judicial resources. Regardless of whether a judge grants a defendant‟s request to proceed pro se, the decision will likely be appealed.205 If the judge allows defendant to represent himself at trial,
which likely will result in a conviction, defendant will argue on appeal that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent.206 Conversely,
if the judge refuses to allow defendant to proceed pro se, defendant
will likely appeal on the ground that his constitutional right to selfrepresentation was violated.207
Requirements imposed on trial courts seek to limit the harmful effects of the decision, such as providing warnings to defendants
of the harmful repercussions of defending pro se, mandating that all
waivers be knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and appointing standby counsel. Further limiting the right to self-representation, courts
recognize forfeiture in the event of obstreperous behavior and require
that the exercise of all requests in a timely manner. However, while
203

Decker, supra note 92, at 598.
Id. at 488-89.
205
Brian H. Wright, The Formal Inquiry Approach: Balancing a Defendant’s Right to
Proceed Pro Se with a Defendant’s Right to Assistance of Counsel, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 785,
785-86 (1993).
206
Id.
207
Id.
204
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attempting to limit the burden which pro se representation places on
ensuring the fair and orderly administration of justice, these limitations have in effect caused further inconsistencies among the courts.
Since Faretta’s recognition of the right of self-representation,
courts have struggled to grapple with the multiplicity of difficult legal
issues that have arisen. First, courts remain burdened by the task of
deciphering exactly what constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel.
While some courts have demanded relinquishment of the right to
counsel be unambiguous and unequivocal, others have interpreted repeated refusals to cooperate with counsel as an implicit election to
defend pro se. Second, while courts conclusively agree that defendants should be admonished of the dangers of self-representation,
there is no clear standard governing the communications a trial judge
may impart without infringing on the right to self-representation.
Moreover, while agreeing that requests to defend pro se must be
timely, no definite standard for what constitutes a timely waiver of
the right to counsel exists.
Third, courts remain constrained in their power to judge a defendant‟s incompetency by the assertion that pro se defendants are
not required to possess any legal abilities whatsoever. Although the
Supreme Court attempted to distinguish mental capacity to stand trial
from mental capacity to represent oneself, courts continue to rely on
the same standard, thereby endorsing ill-fated inept defendants to
embark on a path of self-destruction. Fourth, courts struggle to define a fitting role for standby counsel, who may be imposed upon a
pro se defendant against his wishes, but who avoids Faretta’s characterization of becoming a “master.” It is difficult to reconcile a right
derived from the Sixth Amendment, which recognizes that competent
counsel may impair a defendant‟s right to self-representation, with
the subsequent imposition of standby counsel on a defendant who believes he has the boundless authority to represent himself. Nevertheless, courts are still faced with the challenge of defining the scope of
authority maintained by standby counsel, making it difficult to determine when involvement crosses the line.
If these procedural questions were the only issues left to resolve, there might be hope for one day establishing uniformity of
procedure for pro se defendants. However, any optimism is shattered
when one evaluates the additional difficulties posed by pro se defendants, who tend to be a thorn in the side of any trial court that en-
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counters them. Defendants wish to proceed pro se for a variety of
reasons. Most of the time defendants want to demonstrate their disrespect for authority, exhibit their rebelliousness and hostility, manipulate the justice system, or promote a radical political scheme.208
Even if these defendants have no hidden agenda, they are often so
outlandish and irrational that they believe they can succeed.209 However, regardless of whether pro se defendants are “political extremist[s], . . . misfit[s], or . . . incorrigible career criminal[s] with nothing
to lose,” they all have one undeniable thing in common—they are
rarely acting in their best interest.210 It is illogical to believe that a
defendant facing criminal charges with no legal background whatsoever can effectively construct and articulate a defense, a skill that
takes any competent attorney years of schooling and experience to
master. Thus, to afford defendants the detrimental right to defend pro
se in no way promotes the Sixth Amendment‟s policy of safeguarding
the interests of a criminal defendant. Furthermore, pro se defendants
have fittingly earned a reputation of being disruptive and troublesome
to the judicial process. Therefore, while defendants should never be
afforded the right to self-annihilation, it certainly should not come at
the expense of safely administering justice in the courtroom.
In People v. Smith, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, upheld the right of a criminal defendant to proceed pro se.211
This decision signifies an effort to preserve the right to selfrepresentation by ensuring pro se defendants an opportunity to participate in sidebar conferences. The decision demonstrates an additional
attempt by the court to define the scope of self-representation, an area
that was left largely undefined by the Faretta decision and remains
unresolved. Setting these boundaries poses an infinite task that has
only resulted in limitations of the right followed by subsequent expansions with little standardization among jurisdictions. Thus, the
pro se defendant‟s scanty chance of success also largely depends on
the courtroom in which he sits. Courts will continue to struggle to
uphold the right of self-representation while simultaneously battling
the stark implications that accompany this right. Despite the interest
of autonomy that underlies its conception, the right to self208
209
210
211

Decker, supra note 92, at 485-87.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 597-98.
Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
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representation continues to engulf the very purpose for which it was
designed—to protect the trial interests of the accused.
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